INTRODUCTION
After spending nearly six years on death row for a crime he did not commit, Walter McMillian is now a free man. In December of 1987 he was indicted, along with Ralph Bernard Myers, for capital murder.
1 Although he held two jobs, had no history of violence, and had no record of serious crime, McMillian was accused of participating in the well-publicized slaying of a young woman.2 On June 3, 1987, McMillian's alleged accomplice, Myers, was arrested for the murder, and in a lengthy tape-recorded interview with the police he repeatedly denied any knowledge of McMillian's involvement in the crime. 3 Four days later, McMillian was also arrested for the murder. In an extraordinary move, McMillian was placed on death row before his trial had even begun. 4 During the year before McMillian's trial, Myers told four state doctors on separate occasions that he felt pressure from the police to testify falsely against McMillian. 5 At McMillian's trial, in return for a promise that he would be permitted to plead guilty to a noncapital offense, Myers testified that he waited in a truck while McMillian committed the murder. Myers also testified that McMillian later made incriminating statements regarding the crime. 6 The only other evidence linking McMillian to the crime was the testimony of two witnesses who received money from the state for testifying that they saw McMillian's truck at the crime scene the morning of the murder. 7 Despite the lack of physical evidence and the testimony of a dozen witnesses claiming that he was at home the morning of the murder, 8 McMillian was convicted and sentenced to death.
After five unsuccessful appeals, the state of Alabama finally conceded that McMillian never should have been convicted.9 Myers himself had admitted that police officers had told him what to say at McMillian's trial. 10 The other two prosecution witnesses also eventually recanted their inculpatory testimony.11
Following bis release, McMillian filed a civil suit seeking redress for his harm.12 In such a suit, a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed against the various state officials involved because police officers, prosecutors, and judges are generally protected against section 1983 13 damage suits by the doctrine of official immunity.14 Therefore, whether witnesses are entitled to immunity for conspiring with state officials to present perjured testimony is of crucial importance to claimants like McMillian, because witnesses may be the only parties liable for damages under section 1983. 1 5 8. Applebome, supra note 2, at A-1. 12. An action was filed against the sheriff, investigators, corrections officials, and the county for damages caused by their role in McMillian's illegal arrest, trial, conviction, and detainment. McMillian , 878 F. Supp. at 1485.
13. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988) 
14. Under the Supreme Court's § 1983 immunity doctrine, the immunity of the stateemployed conspirator will depend on the function he or she performs, which could vary greatly in the context of a witness-state conspiracy to present perjured testimony. The Supreme Court has not precisely defined the contours of the immunity that attaches to the functions of state officials. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court would probably grant immunity to a prosecutor who conspired to present perjured testimony, as long as probable cause to prosecute had been established before the conspiracy. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2616 & n. 5 (1993) (holding that a prosecutor who solicited fabricated testimony to present to a grand jury acted as an "investigator" because probable cause for the prosecution had not been established, and therefore the prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity). While McMillian's suit is still in the pretrial stage, so far official immunity has shielded the defendants from most of the claims brought under § 1983. McMillian, 878 F.
Supp. at 1544-45.
15. The immunity granted to witness co-conspirators would have to be absolute because the act of conspiring to present perjured testimony cannot be characterized as good faith or reasonable conduct that is protected by qualified immunity. See infra note 55 (distinguishing absolute and qualified immunity). Moreover, if the conduct of witness conspirators is granted immunity from a § 1983 damages claim in federal court, state courts cannot be relied on to provide an effective remedy because even if a state-law remedy exists, state courts are not a neutral forum for witness-state conspiracy litigation.
It is impossible to determine how often witness-state conspiracies16 to fabricate testimony actually occur, but a report on miscarriages of justice shows that approximately one-third of erroneous convictions studied were the result of perjured testimony by prosecution witnesses.17 Those who have been victimized by a conspiracy to present perjured testimony often seek to recover their damages through section 1983, 18 one of the most widely invoked federal remedies today.19 16 . This Note uses the term witness-state conspiracy to describe an agreement between a state official and a witness to present perjured testimony at a judicial proceeding. The term witness conspirator refers to a witness who participates in a witness-state conspiracy. A wit· ness may enter into an agreement to falsify testimony with any state official who has a per· sonal or political interest in the outcome of a particular dispute. The conspiracy may involve either a civil or criminal proceeding, but typically takes place in the setting of a criminal trial. Because all § 1983 witness-state conspiracy claims addressed by the circuit courts to date have been concerned with false testimony designed to inculpate a criminal (or juvenile) de· fendant, this Note assumes that such inculpatory conspiracies are the norm and limits its analysis to them.
17 Cir. 1992) , the Tenth Circuit held that a sheriff's deputy who testified falsely before a grand jury and at a preliminary examination was not entitled to immunity because the act fell outside the scope of conduct entitled to immunity under Briscoe. The court stated that "in the context of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a complaining witness is not absolutely immune from testimony given in a pretrial setting if that testimony is relevant to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or perpetuated the prosecution." 955 F.2d at 1401; see also infra section I.B {dis-cussing the Supreme Court's "functional approach" to § 1983 immunity); infra section II.A (explaining that a common law cause of action for malicious prosecution would have been available against conspiring witnesses). [Vol. 93:2192 In contrast, the Second Circuit has recognized a distinction between witnesses' testimony and witnesses' conspiratorial acts involving testimony, and has held that witnesses ' [Vol. 93:2192 thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .... 36
Although dormant for ninety years, section 1983 is now widely invoked against defendants who have violated a person's federal rights while acting under governmental authority.37 By providing a neutral federal forum, section 1983 has become an important means to check the conduct of state and local governments and officials.
There are two elements of a section 1983 claim. First, the plaintiff must allege that a right provided by either the United States Constitution or by a federal statute has been violated.3B Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but only establishes a civil remedy to enforce preexisting federal law.39 Second, a section 1983 claim can only be brought against a defendant who has acted "under color of state authority." 40 In other words, a valid complaint requires a showing of some nexus between the acts of the defendant and state authority.41
The Supreme Court has liberally construed the state action requirement of section 1983 so that a private person who conspires with a state official is considered to be acting. Thus, when a private person conspires with a state actor to deprive an individual of federal rights, the private person essentially becomes a state actor. A claim that a witness conspired with a state official to present perjured testimony satisfies the requirements of a section 1983 cause of action: a federally protected right of the plaintiff has been violated under color of state law. 44 First, a person who has been harmed by a witness-state conspiracy has been deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, and, perhaps, has also been denied equal protection of the law. 45 Second, a witness-state conspiracy is performed under color of state law. Although witnesses do not act under color of state law merely by testifying at a judicial proceeding, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that witnesses who conspire with a prosecutor or other state official could satisfy the state-action requirement of section 1983. 46 Therefore, unless granted immunity for their conspiratorial acts, witness conspirators are subject to an action for damages under section 1983.
B. The Supreme Court's Approach to Section 1983 Immunity
Despite the fact that the actual language of section 1983 does not grant any immunities, the Supreme Court has construed section 1983 so as to immunize certain conduct from section 1983 claims for damages. Since 1951, the Supreme Court has approached the issue of section 1983 immunity from the premise that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was fully aware of the then-existing 44 To decide whether particular conduct is entitled to immunity, the Supreme Court first looks to the common law as it existed in 1871 to determine whether the conduct or analogous conduct would have been subject to a cause of action. If the conduct would have been immune from civil suit at common law, the Supreme Court examines the legislative history and purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 48 for any indication that Congress intended to abrogate the immunity by passing the Act. Even if the Court is satisfied that Congress did not intend to abolish the particular immunity, it nevertheless analyzes the proposed immunity in light of public policy considerations. 49 As it has developed over the past forty years, the Supreme Court's immunity analysis focuses entirely on the particular function performed by the defendant, and not on the defendant's status "It is by now well settled that the tort liability created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum . . . . One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42nd Congress were familiar with commonlaw principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary." Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991) ("In addition to finding support in the common law, we believe that absolute immunity for a prosecutor's actions in a probable-cause hearing is justified by the policy concerns articulated in Imbler."); Malley, 475 U.S. at 343 ("In the case of the officer applying for a warrant, it is our judgment that the judicial process will on the whole benefit from a rule of qualified rather than absolute immunity."); Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342-43 (" [T] o the extent that traditional reasons for witness immunity are less applicable to governmental witnesses, other considerations of public policy support absolute immunity more emphatically for such persons than for ordinary witnesses."). One explanation of these conflicting statements is that perhaps the Court does not want to be characterized as an "active judiciary," but it also does not want to appear to adhere blindly to the common law of 1871.
or title. 50 Hence, section 1983 immunity analysis is often described as a "functional approach." 51 Under this functional approach, the Supreme Court has decided that judges, 52 prosecutors,53 and police officers, 54 have immunity from section 1983 damages for most of the actions they perform as part of their jobs.55 The case law is clear that section 1983 immunity attaches only to those indiyidual functions that have been historically privileged -the functions of judging, prosecuting, or policing. Not every action of a judge, prosecutor, or police officer is immune: actions which are not historically privileged are actionable. 5 6 When two parties conspire together to violate another's federal rights, the acts of each conspirator must be separately examined to determine whether immunity attaches. Because section 1983 immunity analysis is functional, coconspirators cannot "borrow" each other's immunity.57
50. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342 (emphasizing that previous "cases clearly indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant"). 54. Malley, 475 U.S. at 339 (holding that police officers have qualified immunity for all actions that meet the "objective reasonableness" standard).
55. Whether the conduct is entitled to "qualified" or "absolute" immunity depends on the type of immunity afforded to the conduct at common law. Malley, 475 U.S. at 342 (stating that "[s]ince the statute on its face does not provide for any immunities, we would be going far to read into it an absolute immunity for conduct which was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871"). Qualified immunity generally only protects the good faith and reasonable actions of a defendant, while absolute immunity completely bars a suit without any inquiry into the merits. w. PAGE police with respect to a criminal investigation is functioning as an "investigative officer" and therefore does not have absolute immunity); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (holding that a state court judge does not have absolute immunity for demoting and dismissing a probation officer because the judge is functioning as an "administrator"); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (holding that a police officer does not have absolute immunity for giving false affidavit testimony in seeking an arrest warrant because he is functioning as a "complaining witness").
57. For example, a recent Supreme Court case dealt with a § 1983 suit alleging that a state court judge issued an injunction because of the judge's conspiracy with interested parties. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the action against the judge on the basis of judicial immunity, the co-conspirators were not insulated from liability. The Supreme Court recognized that the effects on the judge and the public as a result of its decision were substantial, yet the Court held ''that the potential harm to the public from denying immunity to private co-conspirators is outweighed by the benefits of providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other persons." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1980). The Supreme Court has cautioned many times that section 1983 immunity is to be used sparingly.ss Prior cases have recognized that almost any act of a state official could be characterized as relating in some way to a function protected by immunity, yet the Supreme Court has declined to grant such expansive immunity.s9 Instead, immunity has been reserved for those acts "closely associated with the judicial process." 60 Only such conduct can be justifiably protected in light of the countervailing interests of the injured party.61 C. Briscoe, Malley, and Their Aftermath The Supreme Court first addressed the immunity of witnesses in Briscoe v. LaHue. 62 Briscoe granted witnesses immunity from section 1983 suits, but this immunity was limited to the act of testifying. Three years later, Malley v. Briggs6 3 held that while the act of testifying is immune, witnesses who obtain arrest warrants without probable cause through testimony in a complaint and supporting affidavit are not entitled to absolute immunity. 64. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added). The Briscoe opinion actually addressed two cases in which damages were sought under § 1983. In the first case, petitioner Briscoe, a convicted burglar, filed a section 1983 claim against a police officer for allegedly violating Briscoe's constitutional right to due process by committing perjury at Briscoe's trial. The police officer had testified that in his opinion Briscoe was one of no more than 50 to 100 people in Bloomington, Indiana whose thumbprint would match the partial thumbprint found at the scene of the crime. Briscoe argued that the testimony was false because the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the state police considered the partial thumbprint to be too incomplete to be of value. 460 U.S. at 326-27. In the second case consolidated in Briscoe, petitioners Vickers and Ballard were jointly tried and convicted of sexual assault. They alleged that a police officer deprived the petitioners of their constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by falsely suggesting in his trial testimony that the petitioners had been the opinion discussed whether lay witnesses were entitled to immunity for the act of testifying. The Supreme Court explained that its analysis was not limited to police officer witnesses because, under a functional approach, immunity depends on the function performed, not on the status of the defendant. 65 A police officer's act of committing perjury is no different from that of any other witness.
The Court found that " § 1983 does not allow recovery of damages against a private party for testimony in a judicial proceeding" for two reasons. 66 68 Second, the Supreme Court found that private witnesses cannot be liable for section 1983 damages arising from their testimony because, under a functional analysis, witnesses have absolute immunity from such suits. 6 9 In accordance with established section 1983 immunity doctrine, the Briscoe Court began by examining whether the common law, as it existed in 1871, granted witnesses absolute immunity from a suit for false testimony. Briscoe identified common law cases and treatises stating that the causes of action of libel and slander were not available in 1871 against witnesses who committed perjury at a judicial proceeding -even if the witness had done so maliciously. 1 0 In fact, the Court found that neither American nor English common law allowed any action for defamatory remarks made by witnesses. 71 Having determined that witnesses in 1871 were immune from suit over their testimony, the Briscoe Court turned to the legislative history of section 1983 to determine whether section 1983 sought to abolish that immunity. The Court focused its inquiry on the predecessor statute of section 1983 -section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 72 The Court found nothing in the legislative history of section one to suggest that Congress intended to abrogate immunity for the act of testifying.13 · The Court next turned to section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was the predecessor statute to section 1985(3).74 Section two allowed for a cause of action against private conspiracies which deprived a person of equal protection of the laws by presenting perjured testimony. 75 The Court held that section two's focus on private conspiracies did not imply that Congress intended section one of the Act -now section 1983 -to be used against individual witnesses for their perjured testimony. 7 6 Congress primarily designed section two of the Act to provide a remedy against private Ku Klux Klan conspiracies to acquit fellow Klan defendants through perjured testimony or other means.77 According to the sponsors of section two, the victims of Klan wrongdoing were deprived of equal protection of the laws if Klan members were systematically acquitted because of private conspiracies.1s The Briscoe
Court noted that section two provided a remedy only for conspiracy, not for the act of giving false testimony itself, because perjury was just one of the possible ways for Klan conspirators to attempt to exculpate a colleague. 79 Further, by contrasting section one and section two of the 1871 Act, the Court concluded that immunity for the act of testifying was proper. Section one of the Act was aimed only at those actions performed under color of state law, and it neither extended the idea of section two to the act of testifying falsely itself nor mentioned 77. 460 U.S. at 336-40. Despite Congress's focus on Klan conspiracies to acquit a defendant through exculpatory testimony, one Senator mentioned the possibility that perjury was being used to convict the innocent. 460 U.S. at 340 n.23 (citing CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871) (statement of Sen. Osborn)). In any event, the actual language of § 1985(3) does not refer to a conspiracy to acquit or convict, but provides a remedy for any conspiracy that violates a person's right to equal protection of the laws. perjured testimony in any context.so Therefore, the Court reasoned that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was not intended to abrogate the common law immunity granted to witnesses for perjured testimony, and hence, the act of testifying should be immune under section 1983 as well.
Before concluding its analysis, the Briscoe Court turned to the sources of common law authority it had previously identified to see if the reasons for granting immunity to the act of testifying in 1871 also applied to a section 1983 claim.s 1 The Court discovered two common law justifications for immunizing the act of testifying: to encourage persons to come forward and testify truthfully, and to protect honest witnesses from frivolous lawsuits. The first reason was undoubtedly the most important.82 The fear of liability could destroy the truth-finding process. Witnesses who fear liability stemming from their testimony may not come forward to testify or, once on the stand, may alter their testimony to avoid liability.s3 Recognizing that a fair trial requires witnesses to be free to express themselves, the common law courts declared as early as 1772 that "'[n]either party, witness, counsel, jury or Judge can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.' " 84 In addition to the need to prevent such fear from distorting the judicial process, some pre-1871 courts expressed concern that honest witnesses might be subject to liability in the absence of immunity because they would have difficulty proving the truth of their statements.ss ·
The Briscoe Court held that the common law rationales for immunizing the act of testifying also justified granting immunity from section 1983 claims. Facilitation of the truth-finding function of the judicial proceeding remains the predominant reason witnesses are immune from section 1983 suits that attack the veracity of their testimony:
It is precisely the function of a judicial proceeding to determine where the truth lies. The ability of courts, under carefully developed procedures, to separate truth from falsity, and the importance of accurately 80 . See generally 460 U.S. at 337-41 (noting that "the language of § 1 -now codified as § 1983 -differs from that of § 2 in essential respects, and we find no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the traditional common-law witness immunity in § 1983 actions"). [Vol. 93:2192 resolving factual disputes in criminal (and civil) cases are such that those involved in judicial proceedings should be "given every encouragement to make a full disclosure of all pertinent information within their knowledge."86
The Supreme Court felt that functions that are "integral parts of the judicial process" must be immune from suit in order to be performed freely. 87 Testifying is clearly such a function: nothing could be more integral to the judicial process. Briscoe also recognized that, like witnesses at common law, honest witnesses sued under section 1983 for allegedly giving false testimony will often be forced to endure the time and expense of a trial because of the difficulty of summarily dismissing such a claim. 88 Therefore, the Court concluded that the act of testifying is entitled to immunity under section 1983 and no exception is warranted for police officer witnesses. 89
Malley: The Recognition of a "Complaining Witness"
Briscoe was not the final word on the subject of witness immunity. In Malley v. Briggs, 90 the Supreme Court held that a police officer who maliciously and without probable cause obtains an arrest warrant through testimony in a complaint and supporting affidavit is not entitled to absolute immunity from a section 1983 action. 91. Pursuant to a legal wiretap, state trooper Malley overheard a conversation in which two individuals discussed a party they attended the night before. Some of the slang used in the conversation could have been interpreted to mean that illegal drugs were used at the party. At one point one of the callers mentioned that "Jimmy" and "Louisa" were at the party. On the basis of this and another call, Malley drew up a felony complaint against James and Louisa Briggs, stating they conspired to violate Rhode Island's uniform controlled substance act by having marijuana in their possession during a party at their house. Malley also stated in his affidavit testimony the substance of the two telephone calls and what he interpreted them to mean. Based on the complaint and affidavit, the Briggses were arrested and charged. The evidence against the Briggses constituted appreciably less than probable cause and the charges against them were dropped when the grand jury refused to return an indict-the common law of 1871. The Supreme Court found that at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted, witnesses who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint did not have immunity if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause. 92 Such witnesses were known as "complaining witnesses," and the fact that they played an active role in initiating prosecution subjected them to a suit for malicious prosecution.
Moreover, the Malley Court refused to draw an analogy to the immunity afforded a prosecutor at common law because the common law clearly treated complaining witnesses and prosecutors differently with respect to immunity. 93 Because the common law at the time of section 1983's enactment did not grant immunity to complaining witnesses and because the Court could not discern any public policy justifications for immunizing the conduct of the state trooper, Malley was not entitled to immunity.
II. WirY WITNESS CONSPIRATORS SHOULD NoT BE IMMUNE FROM SECTION 1983 Surrs
This Part argues that under the Supreme Court's functional approach to immunity, witnesses9 4 who conspire with a state official to present perjured testimony should not be granted immunity from a section 1983 claim for damages. Section II.A examines the common law of 1871 and concludes that witness conspirators would not have been immune from civil suit. Instead, witness conspirators would have been subject to a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Section II.B analyzes the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and finds that Congress did not intend to depart from the common law with respect to malicious prosecution claims against witness conspirators. Section II.C concludes that public policy considerations weigh in favor of allowing section 1983 suits against witness conspirators because holding witness conspirators accountable for their actions serves important purposes without unduly burdening the judicial system. [Vol. 93:2192
A. Common Law Immunity
Application of the Supreme Court's section 1983 immunity doctrine begins with an examination of the common law as it existed in 1871, which reveals that the act of conspiring to present perjured testimony would not have been entitled to immunity. While the act of giving false testimony and the act of conspiring to present false testimony are related in that both involve false testimony, the acts were distinct under the common law. As recognized by Briscoe, those witnesses whose sole function was to give testimony were immune from an action for damages in 1871. 95 By immunizing the act of testifying from the causes of action of slander and libel, common law courts blocked all challenges to the substance of witnesses' testimony,96 whatever its form.97 Witnesses were immune from slander and libel suits because common law courts found that society's interest in encouraging witnesses to testify truthfully by insulating the act of testifying from liability outweighed potential plaintiffs' interests in recovery for damages to their reputations.98
In contrast, witnesses who conspired with a state official to present perjured testimony would have been subject to liability at common law. While witness conspirators' actual act of testifying would have been immune, the act of conspiring with state officials to present false testimony would have been subject to an action for damages. As recognized by Malley, witnesses who not only testified but played an active role in invoking legal process for illegitimate reasons were commonly known as "complaining witnesses" and subject to a common law action for malicious prosecution.99 A common 95. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1983). 96. The English rule granted absolute immunity for all utterances of witnesses at judicial proceedings, while American courts often imposed the additional requirement that witnesses' statements be "relevant" to the judicial proceeding. The term "relevant" was broadly defined, however, so as to include any testimony that was reasonably related to the issue of the case. law action for malicious prosecution was not limited to cases in which a defendant actually initiated legal proceedings.mo Any person who knowingly and maliciously assisted in continuing a civil or criminal proceeding without probable cause was liable for malicious prosecution. 10 1 In the words of a leading nineteenth-century treatise:
It is not necessary ... that the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution should be the originator of the prosecution. It is enough to render him liable in damages that he voluntarily participated in the prosecution, and that it was carried on with his countenance and approbation .... 102 The only difference between one who initiated a judicial proceeding and one who maliciously and knowingly assisted was that the latter was only liable for damages accruing after assistance was rendered.10 3 Witnesses who merely testified falsely in judicial proceedings would not have been liable for common law malicious prosecution because the cause of action required that the defendant actively encourage prosecution. According to treatises from the late nineteenth century, a defendant does not adopt the malicious intent necessary for a common law malicious prosecution claim simply by participating in a judicial proceeding that is continued without probable cause. 104 The defendant must not only know that the judicial proceeding is continuing without probable cause but also maliciously assist another in bringing the judicial process to bear against an undeserving person. Citing cases from both the nineteenth and ; see also supra note 24 (stating that the Tenth Circuit has recognized that common law actions for malicious prosecution were available against witnesses who either initiated or perpetuated the prosecution, even though the circuit has failed to realize that malicious prosecution suits would have been available against conspiring witnesses); cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, § 119 (although this treatise was published much later than 1871, it also states that a defendant may be liable for malicious prosecution by either initiating or continuing a judicial proceeding}.
101. An action for malicious prosecution also required that the underlying judicial proceeding either be terminated in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff or abandoned before its conclusion. BIGELOW, supra note 100, at 196-97; 4 WAIT, supra note 99, at 337. The defendant is not liable [for malicious prosecution] merely because of approval or silent acquiescence in the acts of another, nor for appearing as a witness against the accused, even though the testimony be perjured, since the necessities of a free trial demand that witnesses are not to be deterred by fear of tort suits, and shall be immune from liability. On the other hand, if the defendant advises or assists another to begin the proceeding, ratifies it when it is begun in defendant's behalf, or takes any active part in directing or aiding the conduct of the case, the defendant will be responsible. 1 os
Witnesses who conspire with a state official to present perjured testimony would have been subject to a malicious prosecution suit in 1871 regardless of whether the conspiracy began before or after the proceeding commenced because, by agreeing to give false testimony, witness conspirators maliciously instigate or continue a judicial prosecution without probable cause. In fact, a clear historical link exists between a witness-state conspiracy claim and an action for malicious prosecution. At early common law, the forerunner of an action for malicious prosecution was the writ of conspiracy, which was employed only when witnesses maliciously conspired to abuse legal procedure. 106 Eventually, the suit focused on the abuse of legal process rather than on the combining of two or more persons, and an action on the case was made available against complaining witnesses even if the malicious abuse of process was not part of a conspiracy.101
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy the common law distinguished between granting immunity for defamatory testimony and holding witnesses liable for malicious prosecution. Common law courts expressly recognized that the need to protect persons from unwarranted legal process -as opposed to mere defamatory words -outweighed the need to protect participants in the judicial system. 1 os Unlike a challenge to the substance of witnesses' testi-mony, a suit for malicious prosecution did not only seek redress for injury to reputation. A suit for malicious prosecution was also aimed at recovering damages sustained as a result of unwarranted restrictions on property or physical freedom.109
B. The Legislative History and Purposes of Section 1983
In determining the scope of section 1983 immunity, the Supreme Court first looks to the common law of 1871, and then to the legislative history of section 1983 to see if Congress meant to change the common law rule. Nothing in the legislative history or purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 suggests that the forty-second Congress intended to depart from the common law with respect to malicious prosecution claims. Section one of the Act -now codified as section 1983 -was designed to provide a broad-based federal remedy for violations of civil rights 110 and the congressional debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1871 do not suggest that Congress intended to exempt witness conspirators from liability for malicious prosecution. 1 11 In fact, the legislative history of section two of the Act -now codified as section 1985 (3) 112 -indicates that members of the 42d Congress were not only aware of, but concerned about the harm resulting from conspiracies involving perjured testimony.113 Section two was aimed at the private conspiratorial activities of the Ku Klux Klan, including conspiracies to acquit fellow And if a counsel, in the course of a cause, utter observations injurious to individuals and not relevant to the matter in issue, it seems to me that he would not therefor be responsible in a common action for slander, but that it would be necessary to sue him in a special action on the case, in which it must be alleged in the declaration and proved at the trial that the matter was spoken maliciously and without probable and reasonable cause .••• It is manifest then that if [the defendant's] application for the warrant was not an honest one with a view to a criminal prosecution, his words could not be protected as having been made in the course of a legal proceeding. Shelfer, 47 N.C. at 173, 176. For further discussion of the reasons witness conspirators should not be immune from a suit for damages, see infra section 11.C. 113. Although the Briscoe Court expressly refused to extrapolate from the legislative history relating to section two of the 1871 Act, it did so partly because section two was "specifically directed toward private conspiracies" to commit perjury, while the Court was concerned with witness perjury -not conspiracy -performed "under color of law." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1983) . The congressional ideas reflected in section two are relevant in determining the liability of witness conspirators because the conduct targeted by section two is so similar.
[Vol. 93:2192 Klan members based on perjured testimony.114 Such conspiracies would not have been subject to an action for malicious prosecution because their object was not to bring about unwarranted judicial process, but to avoid warranted judicial process.11s Therefore, the fact that section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 encompasses more conduct than would have constituted common law malicious prosecution suggests that Congress did not intend to limit malicious prosecution claims, but sought to expand the cause of action to private conspirators in cases involving class-based discrimination.
C. Public Policy Considerations
Witnesses who conspire with state officials to present perjured testimony should be denied immunity as a matter of public policy. Granting immunity to witness conspirators haphazardly and unnecessarily expands the scope of section 1983 immunity recognized in Briscoe. Furthermore, failure to hold witness conspirators accountable under section 1983 creates a perverse incentive for individuals to commit perjury and seriously undermines the legitimacy of the legal system. Although allowing damage claims against witness conspirators will entail additional costs to society, these costs are not unduly burdensome. Procedural checks on frivolous lawsuits will minimize the effects of baseless section 1983 actions on the judicial system.
Witness Conspirator Accountability Under Section 1983
Allowing section 1983 claims against witness conspirators is not only consistent with the objectives of both section 1983 and the Supreme Court's immunity doctrine, but it also prevents the creation of a perverse incentive to commit perjury and promotes the legitimacy of the judicial system. First, the Supreme Court has declared that section 1983 immunity must be narrowly construed. 116 Conduct is entitled to immunity only when strong public interest necessitates such protection.11 7 Thus, the Supreme Court has reserved immunity for those functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 11 8 Both the Briscoe Court and the common law granted immunity to witnesses who give false testimony because the act of testifying is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the legal process. In contrast, the common law tort of malicious prosecution recognized in Malley involves initiating or actively continuing a legal proceeding. The Supreme Court stated in Malley that although a police officer's act of seeking an arrest warrant is a vital part of the administration of criminal justice, it is not entitled to immunity because the initiation of process by a complaining witness is relatively removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings. 119 Accordingly, initiating or actively continuing a legal proceeding by conspiring to present perjured testimony is not a function intimately associated with the judicial phase of the legal process. A conspiracy takes place outside of court and is an active effort to misuse legal process. The common law courts came to the conclusion in 1871 that a conspiracy to commit perjury was not sufficiently integral to the judicial process to justify immunity, and therefore allowed malicious prosecution claims against complaining witnesses. 120 There is no reason for a different result under section 1983, particularly since the Court wants section 1983 immunity to be available only when strong public interests demand it.
Second, weighing the interests involved in a witness conspirator case reveals that granting immunity to witness conspirators is not justified. The balancing of interests with respect to witness conspirators results in a different conclusion than that reached by the Briscoe Court with respect to perjury by individual witnesses. The harm caused by witness conspirators is greater than that caused by non-conspiring witnesses, because when witnesses merely give false testimony, the only certain injury is a damaged reputation. Perjured testimony alone may or may not cause unwarranted restrictions on property and personal liberty; it depends on whether such testimony was material to the outcome of the judicial proceeding. In contrast, witness conspirators inevitably cause damage not only to reputation but also to property or personal liberty. The damage to property or personal liberty is certain because witness conspirators play active roles in forcing people to endure unwarranted judicial process, even if the trial does not result in conviction.
Third, granting witness conspirators immunity would create a perverse incentive for individuals to commit perjury. Any person [Vol. 93:2192 who conspires to bring about unwarranted legal process would be able to sidestep civil liability simply by testifying. Such a rule would protect the most culpable conspirators instead of deterring them. This absurd result was reached in a Sixth Circuit case where the court found that two witnesses who allegedly conspired with the mayor and the city to present perjured testimony had immunity from a section 1983 suit, but the mayor and the city did not have absolute immunity because the doctrine of witness immunity "shields from liability only those defendants who gave testimony in a judicial proceeding. "121 Finally, the public will perceive the state judicial process as more legitimate if witnesses are held accountable when they conspire with the state itself to misuse the state power. Failure to hold witnesses accountable in such situations could have detrimental effects on the public's respect for the prosecutorial arm of state.
Burden on the Judicial System
Justice comes with a price. This section argues, however, that there are three reasons why the relatively minor costs imposed on the judicial system by holding witness conspirators liable for damages under section 1983 do not justify granting immunity for their conduct. First, addressing the specific concern of the Briscoe Court, holding witness conspirators accountable for their actions will not obstruct the truth-finding function of the courts. In protecting witnesses from section 1983 damage claims which challenge the substance of their testimony, the Supreme Court recognized the need to encourage witnesses to take the stand and testify truthfully.122 The proposed rule will not frustrate the goal of the Briscoe Court because witnesses' testimony will remain absolutely immune from suit; only the conspiracy will be subject to challenge. Further isolating witnesses from liability for their conspiratorial actions can only have a negative impact on the judicial system's search for truth. Despite the close relation, agreeing to present perjured testimony is not part of the act of testifying. The Supr.eme Court has expressly declined to read immunity so expansively as to protect all acts which can be characterized as related to immune conduct. 123 Although perjury may be an undesirable by-product of any judicial proceeding, conspiracy to present perjured testimony presents much more serious problems. When two or more persons collude, 121. Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173, 1174 {6th Cir. 1987 ). 122. See supra section II.B.2 (explaining that the Briscoe Court found that the primary common-law reason for protecting the testimony of witnesses -to avoid self-censorship by witnesses -is a valid concern in the context of a § 1983 suit for damages).
123. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
the likelihood of a serious miscarriage of justice multiplies and Briscoe's stated goal of the pursuit of truth militates against immunity.
Second, in denying section 1983 immunity in the past, the Supreme Court has been willing to accept the fact that its decision would result in an increased number of suits, as well as some burden on state officials who participated in the activity but are entitled to immunity for their conduct. 124 Such costs, according to the Court, are not too high of a price to pay for "providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other persons."125 After all, the purpose of the judicial system is to adjudicate disputes, and the immunity afforded state officials is not designed to insulate the official from all aspects of public accountability. 12 6 Despite the fact that state officials and witnesses conspire together, functional analysis requires that the immunity of the participants be determined independently. 127 Thus, to the extent that witnesses cause injury by agreeing to give false testimony, they should be liable for damages under section 1983. 1 28 Finally, two procedural requirements will prevent baseless section 1983 witness-state conspiracy suits from becoming unduly burdensome to the judicial system and its participants. 12 9 First, due to the specific pleading requirements of conspiracy, a plaintiff cannot simply transform a perjury claim into a claim of conspiracy to commit perjury. 130 A suit that does not contain sufficiently detailed allegations of an agreement between a witness and a state official to present perjured testimony can be disposed of at an early stage upon a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or (Vol. 93:2192 a motion for summary judgment. 131 Hollow, unsubstantiated claims of conspiracy may also be subject to sanctions under Rule 11.132
Second, section 1983 witness-state conspiracy suits will not unnecessarily burden the judicial system because a section 1983 claim cannot be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction.133 A convicted criminal defendant is more likely to explore all possibilities of release than to concentrate on a meritless damages claim. The limitation on section 1983 suits should be extended to bar any section 1983 claim against witness conspirators unless the underlying judicial proceeding was either dismissed or terminated in favor of the section 1983 plaintiff. Such a requirement is consistent with the elements of a common law malicious prosecution cause of action. 134 CONCLUSION Perhaps as a result of the growing caseload of the federal courts, the Supreme Court has limited the number of section 1983 suits by recognizing immunity for some conduct. However, the Court's approach to section 1983 immunity has been cautious: Relying on the common law for guidance, the Supreme Court has left intact the remedy provided by section 1983 where there is compelling need for it.
Victims of witness-state conspiracies have a compelling need to have access to meaningful relief. But such relief will not be available if every participant in a witness-state conspiracy is immune from suit. Although there may be good reasons to grant state officials immunity for their roles in witness-state conspiracies, there is 131. For example, although the Second Circuit has held that witnesses who conspire with a state actor to present false testimony do not have absolute immunity, the Court has relied on the specific pleading requirements of conspiracy to dismiss meritless claims. In San Filippo, the court observed:
[A]t no point in the proceedings has plaintiff alleged one shred of evidence in support of his conclusory assertion of conspiracy, beyond the fact that [the prosecutor and the detective] met with defendants prior to their grand jury testimony. We see nothing suspicious or improper in such meetings, which are routine and necessary in preparation of evidence. If the mere allegation of their occurrence is sufficient ••• we agree with [defendants] that virtually every witness for the government could face the burden of defending a costly civil suit charging 'conspiracy' to give false testimony. San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 256 (2d Cir. 1984 
